Инструмент · брачный договор
Навигатор брачного договора
Укажите, с какими странами связаны супруги, что защищаете и планируете ли переезд. За минуту увидите, какой договор нужен вашей паре, где его заключать, что в нём можно зафиксировать — и что именно даст ему силу в каждой затронутой стране.
Супруг 1
Гражданство · можно несколько
Где живёт · можно несколько
Супруг 2
Гражданство · можно несколько
Где живёт · можно несколько
Ситуация
Что защищаем
Частые вопросы
Действует ли брачный договор за границей?
Только следующие указанные режимы: Европейский союз
Что Регламент2016/1103 устанавливает о выборе права и форме брачного соглашения?
Записанные правила доступны; их применимость к этому случаю не подтверждена.
Записанное положение 1
В охватываемом режиме будущие или нынешние супруги могут выбрать право государства обычного проживания любого из них или гражданства любого на дату соглашения. Изменение права во время брака по умолчанию действует на будущее; обратное действие не должно ухудшать права третьих лиц. Соглашение о выборе права и имущественное соглашение — разные документы: статьи23 и25 требуют письменной формы, даты и подписей, включая устойчивую электронную запись, и сохраняют дополнительные требования по обычному проживанию и, для имущественного соглашения, применимому праву. Статья24 регулирует согласие и материальную действительность выбора; статья27 — материальную действительность имущественного соглашения. Нотариальная форма сама по себе не решает все эти вопросы. Доказательственные и исполнительные эффекты акта в другом участвующем государстве имеют отдельные условия. Пределы регистрации, третьих лиц, обязательных норм и переходных дат сохраняются.
Это записанный контекст указанных источников, а не вывод о личном праве, исчерпывающей действующей норме или применимости к конкретному делу. Территория, даты, документы, факты сторон и исключения проверяются отдельно. Только система участвующих государств по названному Регламенту; это не мировое правило и не автоматическая привязка конкретной пары.
нет в исходниках
первоисточник указан, цитата сверена 18.10.2026
Источник проверен в пределах записанного периода.
Проверка источника подтверждена; это не вывод о применимости права.
Дата проверки записи: 2026-10-18
Проверка исходного материала: 2026-10-18T17:30:35.088Z
Плановая перепроверка записи: 2027-10-18
Плановая перепроверка источника: 2027-10-18T17:30:35.088Z
Источники: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Источники и цитаты
[1]
‘2. If the proceedings in the Member State of origin were instituted before 29 January 2019, decisions given on or after that date shall be recognised and enforced in accordance with Chapter IV as long as the rules of jurisdiction applied comply with those set out in Chapter II.
3. Chapter III shall apply only to spouses who marry or who specify the law applicable to the matrimonial property regime on or after 29 January 2019.’.
Corrigendum to Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R1103R(01)
Место в источнике: Official corrigendum Article69(2),(3) corrected full text
Дата источника: 2017-04-29
Проверено: 2026-10-18
[2]
Article 59
Enforceability of authentic instruments
1. An authentic instrument which is enforceable in the Member State of origin shall be declared enforceable in another Member State on the application of any interested party in accordance with the procedure provided for in Articles 44 to 57.
2. For the purposes of point (b) of Article 45(3), the authority which established the authentic instrument shall, on the application of any interested party, issue an attestation using the form established in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 67(2).
3. The court with which an appeal is lodged under Article 49 or Article 50 shall refuse or revoke a declaration of enforceability only if enforcement of the authentic instrument is manifestly contrary to public policy (ordre public) in the Member State of enforcement.
Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 — Article59
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R1103
Место в источнике: Article59 complete addressed text
Дата источника: —
Проверено: 2026-10-18
[3]
Article 29
Adaptation of rights in rem
Where a person invokes a right in rem to which he is entitled under the law applicable to the matrimonial property regime and the law of the Member State in which the right is invoked does not know the right in rem in question, that right shall, if necessary and to the extent possible, be adapted to the closest equivalent right under the law of that State, taking into account the aims and the interests pursued by the specific right in rem and the effects attached to it.
Article 30
Overriding mandatory provisions
1. Nothing in this Regulation shall restrict the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the forum.
2. Overriding mandatory provisions are provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a Member State for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the matrimonial property regime pursuant to this Regulation.
Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 — Articles29–30
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R1103
Место в источнике: Articles29to30 complete addressed text
Дата источника: —
Проверено: 2026-10-18
[4]
Article 1
Scope
1. This Regulation shall apply to matrimonial property regimes.
It shall not apply to revenue, customs or administrative matters.
2. The following shall be excluded from the scope of this Regulation:
(a)
the legal capacity of spouses;
(b)
the existence, validity or recognition of a marriage;
(c)
maintenance obligations;
(d)
the succession to the estate of a deceased spouse;
(e)
social security;
(f)
the entitlement to transfer or adjustment between spouses, in the case of divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment, of rights to retirement or disability pension accrued during marriage and which have not generated pension income during the marriage;
(g)
the nature of rights in rem relating to a property; and
(h)
any recording in a register of rights in immoveable or moveable property, including the legal requirements for such recording, and the effects of recording or failing to record such rights in a register.
Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103, addressed article — Article 1 full
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R1103
Место в источнике: Article 1 full
Дата источника: —
Проверено: 2026-10-18
[5]
Article 20
Universal application
The law designated as applicable by this Regulation shall be applied whether or not it is the law of a Member State.
Article 21
Unity of the applicable law
The law applicable to a matrimonial property regime pursuant to Article 22 or 26 shall apply to all assets falling under that regime, regardless of where the assets are located.
Article 22
Choice of the applicable law
1. The spouses or future spouses may agree to designate, or to change, the law applicable to their matrimonial property regime, provided that that law is one of the following:
(a)
the law of the State where the spouses or future spouses, or one of them, is habitually resident at the time the agreement is concluded; or
(b)
the law of a State of nationality of either spouse or future spouse at the time the agreement is concluded.
2. Unless the spouses agree otherwise, a change of the law applicable to the matrimonial property regime made during the marriage shall have prospective effect only.
3. Any retroactive change of the applicable law under paragraph 2 shall not adversely affect the rights of third parties deriving from that law.
Article 23
Formal validity of the agreement on a choice of applicable law
1. The agreement referred to in Article 22 shall be expressed in writing, dated and signed by both spouses. Any communication by electronic means which provides a durable record of the agreement shall be deemed equivalent to writing.
2. If the law of the Member State in which both spouses have their habitual residence at the time the agreement is concluded lays down additional formal requirements for matrimonial property agreements, those requirements shall apply.
3. If the spouses are habitually resident in different Member States at the time the agreement is concluded and the laws of those States provide for different formal requirements for matrimonial property agreements, the agreement shall be formally valid if it satisfies the requirements of either of those laws.
4. If only one of the spouses is habitually resident in a Member State at the time the agreement is concluded and that State lays down additional formal requirements for matrimonial property agreements, those requirements shall apply.
Article 24
Consent and material validity
1. The existence and validity of an agreement on choice of law or of any term thereof, shall be determined by the law which would govern it pursuant to Article 22 if the agreement or term were valid.
2. Nevertheless, a spouse may, in order to establish that he did not consent, rely upon the law of the country in which he has his habitual residence at the time the court is seised if it appears from the circumstances that it would not be reasonable to determine the effect of his conduct in accordance with the law specified in paragraph 1.
Article 25
Formal validity of a matrimonial property agreement
1. The matrimonial property agreement shall be expressed in writing, dated and signed by both spouses. Any communication by electronic means which provides a durable record of the agreement shall be deemed equivalent to writing.
2. If the law of the Member State in which both spouses have their habitual residence at the time the agreement is concluded lays down additional formal requirements for matrimonial property agreements, those requirements shall apply.
If the spouses are habitually resident in different Member States at the time the agreement is concluded and the laws of those States provide for different formal requirements for matrimonial property agreements, the agreement shall be formally valid if it satisfies the requirements of either of those laws.
If only one of the spouses is habitually resident in a Member State at the time the agreement is concluded and that State lays down additional formal requirements for matrimonial property agreements, those requirements shall apply.
3. If the law applicable to the matrimonial property regime imposes additional formal requirements, those requirements shall apply.
Article 26
Applicable law in the absence of choice by the parties
1. In the absence of a choice-of-law agreement pursuant to Article 22, the law applicable to the matrimonial property regime shall be the law of the State:
(a)
of the spouses' first common habitual residence after the conclusion of the marriage; or, failing that
(b)
of the spouses' common nationality at the time of the conclusion of the marriage; or, failing that
(c)
with which the spouses jointly have the closest connection at the time of the conclusion of the marriage, taking into account all the circumstances.
2. If the spouses have more than one common nationality at the time of the conclusion of the marriage, only points (a) and (c) of paragraph 1 shall apply.
3. By way of exception and upon application by either spouse, the judicial authority having jurisdiction to rule on matters of the matrimonial property regime may decide that the law of a State other than the State whose law is applicable pursuant to point (a) of paragraph 1 shall govern the matrimonial property regime if the applicant demonstrates that:
(a)
the spouses had their last common habitual residence in that other State for a significantly longer period of time than in the State designated pursuant to point (a) of paragraph 1; and
(b)
both spouses had relied on the law of that other State in arranging or planning their property relations.
The law of that other State shall apply as from the conclusion of the marriage, unless one spouse disagrees. In the latter case, the law of that other State shall have effect as from the establishment of the last common habitual residence in that other State.
The application of the law of the other State shall not adversely affect the rights of third parties deriving from the law applicable pursuant to point (a) of paragraph 1.
This paragraph shall not apply when the spouses have concluded a matrimonial property agreement before the establishment of their last common habitual residence in that other State.
Article 27
Scope of the applicable law
The law applicable to the matrimonial property regime pursuant to this Regulation shall govern, inter alia:
(a)
the classification of property of either or both spouses into different categories during and after marriage;
(b)
the transfer of property from one category to the other one;
(c)
the responsibility of one spouse for liabilities and debts of the other spouse;
(d)
the powers, rights and obligations of either or both spouses with regard to property;
(e)
the dissolution of the matrimonial property regime and the partition, distribution or liquidation of the property;
(f)
the effects of the matrimonial property regime on a legal relationship between a spouse and third parties; and
(g)
the material validity of a matrimonial property agreement.
Article 28
Effects in respect of third parties
1. Notwithstanding point (f) of Article 27, the law applicable to the matrimonial property regime between the spouses may not be invoked by a spouse against a third party in a dispute between the third party and either or both of the spouses unless the third party knew or, in the exercise of due diligence, should have known of that law.
2. The third party is deemed to possess the knowledge of the law applicable to the matrimonial property regime, if:
(a)
that law is the law of:
(i)
the State whose law is applicable to the transaction between a spouse and the third party;
(ii)
the State where the contracting spouse and the third party have their habitual residence; or,
(iii)
in cases involving immoveable property, the State in which the property is situated;
or
(b)
either spouse had complied with the applicable requirements for disclosure or registration of the matrimonial property regime specified by the law of:
(i)
the State whose law is applicable to the transaction between a spouse and the third party;
(ii)
the State where the contracting spouse and the third party have their habitual residence; or
(iii)
in cases involving immoveable property, the State in which the property is situated.
3. Where the law applicable to the matrimonial property regime between the spouses cannot be invoked by a spouse against a third party by virtue of paragraph 1, the effects of the matrimonial property regime in respect of the third party shall be governed:
(a)
by the law of the State whose law is applicable to the transaction between a spouse and the third party; or
(b)
in cases involving immoveable property or registered assets or rights, by the law of the State in which the property is situated or in which the assets or rights are registered.
Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103, addressed article — Articles 20-28 full
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R1103
Место в источнике: Articles 20-28 full
Дата источника: —
Проверено: 2026-10-18
[6]
Article 58
Acceptance of authentic instruments
1. An authentic instrument established in a Member State shall have the same evidentiary effects in another Member State as it has in the Member State of origin, or the most comparable effects, provided that this is not manifestly contrary to public policy (ordre public) in the Member State concerned.
A person wishing to use an authentic instrument in another Member State may ask the authority establishing the authentic instrument in the Member State of origin to fill in the form established in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 67(2) describing the evidentiary effects which the authentic instrument produces in the Member State of origin.
2. Any challenge relating to the authenticity of an authentic instrument shall be made before the courts of the Member State of origin and shall be decided upon under the law of that State. The authentic instrument challenged shall not produce any evidentiary effect in another Member State for as long as the challenge is pending before the competent court.
3. Any challenge relating to the legal acts or legal relationships recorded in an authentic instrument shall be made before the courts having jurisdiction under this Regulation and shall be decided upon under the law applicable pursuant to Chapter III. The authentic instrument challenged shall not produce any evidentiary effect in a Member State other than the Member State of origin as regards the matter being challenged for as long as the challenge is pending before the competent court.
4. If the outcome of proceedings in a court of a Member State depends on the determination of an incidental question relating to the legal acts or legal relationships recorded in an authentic instrument in matters of matrimonial property regimes, that court shall have jurisdiction over that question.
Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 — Article58
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R1103
Место в источнике: Article58 complete addressed text
Дата источника: —
Проверено: 2026-10-18
Актуальная редакция права: не установлена. Личная применимость и результат для конкретного случая не установлены.
Великобритания
Как суд Англии и Уэльса оценивает иностранное или нотариальное брачное соглашение?
Записанные правила доступны; их применимость к этому случаю не подтверждена.
Зависит от: где (часть страны): Англия и Уэльс
Записанное положение 1
Radmacher[2010]UKSC42 не связывает английский суд автоматически договором. Суд должен придавать действие соглашению, свободно заключённому обеими сторонами при полном понимании последствий, если в актуальных обстоятельствах было бы справедливо удержать стороны его условиями. Давление, обман, ложные сведения, использование доминирующего положения и существенная нехватка информации могут устранить или уменьшить вес соглашения. Полное раскрытие активов может быть необходимо для понимания; отсутствие любой отдельной формальной гарантии не является неизменным автоматическим тестом. Иностранный элемент может показывать намерение придать соглашению действие, но не исключает судебной оценки справедливости. Учитываются дети, потребности, компенсация, изменение обстоятельств и характер имущества. Это не подтверждает признание такого договора в Германии, Франции, Испании, Швейцарии или России.
где (часть страны): Англия и Уэльс
Это записанный контекст указанных источников, а не вывод о личном праве, исчерпывающей действующей норме или применимости к конкретному делу. Территория, даты, документы, факты сторон и исключения проверяются отдельно. Только Англия и Уэльс; не вся Великобритания. Нужны обычная подтверждённая part-scope возможность и свежий current-head CAS; расширение заголовка само по себе не разрешает публикацию.
нет в исходниках
первоисточник указан, цитата сверена 18.10.2026
Источник проверен в пределах записанного периода.
Проверка источника подтверждена; это не вывод о применимости права.
Дата проверки записи: 2026-10-18
Проверка исходного материала: 2026-10-18T17:30:35.088Z
Плановая перепроверка записи: 2027-10-18
Плановая перепроверка источника: 2027-10-18T17:30:35.088Z
Источники: 1, 2
Источники и цитаты
[1]
67. The issues raised on the facts of this case can be placed under three heads:
a. Were there circumstances attending the making of the agreement that
detract from the weight that should be accorded to it?
b. Were there circumstances attending the making of the agreement that
enhance the weight that should be accorded to it; the foreign element?
c. Did the circumstances prevailing when the court’s order was made
make it fair or just to depart from the agreement?
We shall have to consider these questions in the context of the facts of this case,
but at this stage we propose to address the issues of principle that they raise.
Page 27
Factors detracting from the weight to be accorded to the agreement
68. If an ante-nuptial agreement, or indeed a post-nuptial agreement, is to carry
full weight, both the husband and wife must enter into it of their own free will,
without undue influence or pressure, and informed of its implications. The third
and fifth of the six safeguards proposed in the consultation document (see para 5
above) were designed to ensure this. Baron J applied these safeguards, found that
they were not satisfied, and accorded the agreement reduced weight for this reason.
The Court of Appeal did not consider that the circumstances in which the
agreement was reached diminished the weight to be attached to it. In so far as the
safeguards were not strictly satisfied, this was not material on the particular facts
of this case.
69. The safeguards in the consultation document are designed to apply
regardless of the circumstances of the particular case, in order to ensure, inter alia,
that in all cases ante-nuptial contracts will not be binding unless they are freely
concluded and properly informed. It is necessary to have black and white rules of
this kind if agreements are otherwise to be binding. There is no need for them,
however, in the current state of the law. The safeguards in the consultation
document are likely to be highly relevant, but we consider that the Court of Appeal
was correct in principle to ask whether there was any material lack of disclosure,
information or advice. Sound legal advice is obviously desirable, for this will
ensure that a party understands the implications of the agreement, and full
disclosure of any assets owned by the other party may be necessary to ensure this.
But if it is clear that a party is fully aware of the implications of an ante-nuptial
agreement and indifferent to detailed particulars of the other party’s assets, there is
no need to accord the agreement reduced weight because he or she is unaware of
those particulars. What is important is that each party should have all the
information that is material to his or her decision, and that each party should intend
that the agreement should govern the financial consequences of the marriage
coming to an end.
70. It is, of course, important that each party should intend that the agreement
should be effective. In the past it may not have been right to infer from the fact of
the conclusion of the agreement that the parties intended it to take effect, for they
may have been advised that such agreements were void under English law and
likely to carry little or no weight. That will no longer be the case. As we have
shown the courts have recently been according weight, sometimes even decisive
weight, to ante-nuptial agreements and this judgment will confirm that they are
right to do so. Thus in future it will be natural to infer that parties who enter into
an ante-nuptial agreement to which English law is likely to be applied intend that
effect should be given to it.
Page 28
71. In relation to the circumstances attending the making of the nuptial
agreement, this comment of Ormrod LJ in Edgar v Edgar at p 1417, although
made about a separation agreement, is pertinent:
“It is not necessary in this connection to think in formal legal terms,
such as misrepresentation or estoppel; all the circumstances as they
affect each of two human beings must be considered in the complex
relationship of marriage.”
The first question will be whether any of the standard vitiating factors: duress,
fraud or misrepresentation, is present. Even if the agreement does not have
contractual force, those factors will negate any effect the agreement might
otherwise have. But unconscionable conduct such as undue pressure (falling short
of duress) will also be likely to eliminate the weight to be attached to the
agreement, and other unworthy conduct, such as exploitation of a dominant
position to secure an unfair advantage, would reduce or eliminate it.
72. The court may take into account a party’s emotional state, and what
pressures he or she was under to agree. But that again cannot be considered in
isolation from what would have happened had he or she not been under those
pressures. The circumstances of the parties at the time of the agreement will be
relevant. Those will include such matters as their age and maturity, whether either
or both had been married or been in long-term relationships before. For such
couples their experience of previous relationships may explain the terms of the
agreement, and may also show what they foresaw when they entered into the
agreement. What may not be easily foreseeable for less mature couples may well
be in contemplation of more mature couples. Another important factor may be
whether the marriage would have gone ahead without an agreement, or without the
terms which had been agreed. This may cut either way.
73. If the terms of the agreement are unfair from the start, this will reduce its
weight, although this question will be subsumed in practice in the question of
whether the agreement operates unfairly having regard to the circumstances
prevailing at the time of the breakdown of the marriage.
Factors enhancing the weight to be accorded to the agreement; the foreign
element
74. The issue raised under this heading is whether the foreign elements of a
case can enhance the weight to be given to an ante-nuptial agreement. In this case
the husband was French and the wife German and the agreement had a German
Page 29
law clause. We have already explained why we do not consider it material in
English ancillary relief proceedings whether the nuptial agreement under
consideration is or is not a contract. The court can overrule the agreement of the
parties, whether contractual or not, and applies the same criteria when considering
whether to do so. When dealing with agreements concluded in the past, and the
agreement in this case was concluded in 1998, foreign elements such as those in
this case may bear on the important question of whether or not the parties intended
their agreement to be effective. In the case of agreements made in recent times
and, a fortiori, any agreement made after this judgment, the question of whether
the parties intended their agreement to take effect is unlikely to be in issue, so
foreign law will not need to be considered in relation to that question.
Fairness
75. White v White and Miller v Miller establish that the overriding criterion to
be applied in ancillary relief proceedings is that of fairness and identify the three
strands of need, compensation and sharing that are relevant to the question of what
is fair. If an ante-nuptial agreement deals with those matters in a way that the court
might adopt absent such an agreement, there is no problem about giving effect to
the agreement. The problem arises where the agreement makes provisions that
conflict with what the court would otherwise consider to be the requirements of
fairness. The fact of the agreement is capable of altering what is fair. It is an
important factor to be weighed in the balance. We would advance the following
proposition, to be applied in the case of both ante- and post-nuptial agreements, in
preference to that suggested by the Board in MacLeod:
“The court should give effect to a nuptial agreement that is
freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of its
implications unless in the circumstances prevailing it would not
be fair to hold the parties to their agreement.”
76. That leaves outstanding the difficult question of the circumstances in which
it will not be fair to hold the parties to their agreement. This will necessarily
depend upon the facts of the particular case, and it would not be desirable to lay
down rules that would fetter the flexibility that the court requires to reach a fair
result. There is, however, some guidance that we believe that it is safe to give
directed to the situation where there are no tainting circumstances attending the
conclusion of the agreement.
Page 30
Children of the family
77. Section 25 of the 1973 Act provides that first consideration must be given
to the welfare while a minor of any child of the family who is under 18. A nuptial
agreement cannot be allowed to prejudice the reasonable requirements of any
children of the family.
Autonomy
78. The reason why the court should give weight to a nuptial agreement is that
there should be respect for individual autonomy. The court should accord respect
to the decision of a married couple as to the manner in which their financial affairs
should be regulated. It would be paternalistic and patronising to override their
agreement simply on the basis that the court knows best. This is particularly true
where the parties’ agreement addresses existing circumstances and not merely the
contingencies of an uncertain future.
Non-matrimonial property
79. Often parties to a marriage will be motivated in concluding a nuptial
agreement by a wish to make provision for existing property owned by one or
other, or property that one or other anticipates receiving from a third party. The
House of Lords in White v White and Miller v Miller drew a distinction between
such property and matrimonial property accumulated in the course of the marriage.
That distinction is particularly significant where the parties make express
agreement as to the disposal of such property in the event of the termination of the
marriage. There is nothing inherently unfair in such an agreement and there may
be good objective justification for it, such as obligations towards existing family
members. As Rix LJ put it at para 73
“…if the parties to a prospective marriage have something important
to agree with one another, then it is often much better, and more
honest, for that agreement to be made at the outset, before the
marriage, rather than left to become a source of disappointment or
acrimony within marriage.”
Future circumstances
80. Where the ante-nuptial agreement attempts to address the contingencies,
unknown and often unforeseen, of the couple’s future relationship there is more
Page 31
scope for what happens to them over the years to make it unfair to hold them to
their agreement. The circumstances of the parties often change over time in ways
or to an extent which either cannot be or simply was not envisaged. The longer the
marriage has lasted, the more likely it is that this will be the case. Once again we
quote from the judgment of Rix LJ at para 73.
“I have in mind (and in this respect there is no real difference
between an agreement made just before or just after a marriage) that
a pre-nuptial agreement is intended to look forward over the whole
period of a marriage to the possibility of its ultimate failure and
divorce: and thus it is potentially a longer lasting agreement than
almost any other (apart from a lease, and those are becoming shorter
and subject to optional break clauses). Over the potential many
decades of a marriage it is impossible to cater for the myriad
different circumstances which may await its parties. Thorpe LJ has
mentioned the very relevant case of a second marriage between
mature adults perhaps each with children of their own by their first
marriages. However, equally or more typical will be the marriage of
young persons, perhaps not yet adults, for whom the future is an
entirely open book. If in such a case a pre-nuptial agreement should
provide for no recovery by each spouse from the other in the event of
divorce, and the marriage should see the formation of a fortune
which each spouse had played an equal role in their different ways in
creating, but the fortune was in the hands for the most part of one
spouse rather than the other, would it be right to give the same
weight to their early agreement as in another perhaps very different
example?”
The answer to this question is, in the individual case, likely to be ‘no’.
81. Of the three strands identified in White v White and Miller v Miller, it is the
first two, needs and compensation, which can most readily render it unfair to hold
the parties to an ante-nuptial agreement. The parties are unlikely to have intended
that their ante-nuptial agreement should result, in the event of the marriage
breaking up, in one partner being left in a predicament of real need, while the other
enjoys a sufficiency or more, and such a result is likely to render it unfair to hold
the parties to their agreement. Equally if the devotion of one partner to looking
after the family and the home has left the other free to accumulate wealth, it is
likely to be unfair to hold the parties to an agreement that entitles the latter to
retain all that he or she has earned.
82. Where, however, these considerations do not apply and each party is in a
position to meet his or her needs, fairness may well not require a departure from
Page 32
their agreement as to the regulation of their financial affairs in the circumstances
that have come to pass. Thus it is in relation to the third strand, sharing, that the
court will be most likely to make an order in the terms of the nuptial agreement in
place of the order that it would otherwise have made.
83. So far as concerns the general approach of the court to ante-nuptial
agreements, Wilson LJ at para 130 endorsed the following comments of Baron J at
first instance
“111. I am certain that English courts are now much more ready to
attribute the appropriate (and, in the right case, decisive) weight to
an agreement as part of ‘all the circumstances of case’ [within the
meaning of section 25(1) of the Act of 1973] …
119. Upon divorce, when a party is seeking quantification of a claim
for financial relief, it is the court that determines the result after
applying the Act. The court grants the award and formulates the
order with the parties’ agreement being but one factor in the process
and perhaps, in the right case, it being the most compelling factor
…”
We also would endorse these comments.
supremecourt.uk
https://supremecourt.uk/uploads/uksc_2009_0031_judgment_db72197d25.pdf
Место в источнике: Radmacher [2010]UKSC42 paragraphs67–83 contiguous full context
Дата источника: —
Проверено: 2026-10-18
[2]
2. A court when considering the grant of ancillary relief is not obliged to give effect to nuptial agreements - whether they are ante-nuptial or post-nuptial. The parties cannot, by agreement, oust the jurisdiction of the court. The court must, however, give appropriate weight to such an agreement. This appeal raises the question of the principles to be applied by the court when considering the weight that should be attached to an ante-nuptial agreement. The Privy Council recently considered this question in relation to a post-nuptial agreement in MacLeod v MacLeod [2008] UKPC 64, [2010] 1 AC 298 and it will be necessary to consider the implications of that decision.
Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42 paragraph — UKSC [2010]42 majority paragraph 2, PDF page 3
https://supremecourt.uk/uploads/uksc_2009_0031_judgment_db72197d25.pdf
Место в источнике: UKSC [2010]42 majority paragraph 2, PDF page 3
Дата источника: 2010-10-20
Проверено: 2026-10-18
Актуальная редакция права: не установлена. Личная применимость и результат для конкретного случая не установлены.
Можно ли заключить договор, если брак уже зарегистрирован?
Только следующие указанные режимы: Великобритания
Как Radmacher рассматривает соглашения после свадьбы в Англии и Уэльсе?
Записанные правила доступны; их применимость к этому случаю не подтверждена.
Зависит от: где (часть страны): Англия и Уэльс
Записанное положение 1
Соглашение может быть добрачным, заключённым во время совместной жизни после свадьбы или связанным с расставанием; это разные обстоятельства, а не автоматическая иерархия силы. Radmacher не проводит принципиальной границы между соглашением за день до и за день после свадьбы. Суд не обязан механически исполнять ни prenup, ни postnup и сохраняет полномочия; применяет свободную волю, понимание последствий и справедливость с учётом обстоятельств, детей, потребностей и компенсации. Поэтому утверждение «после свадьбы всегда устойчивее» снимается. Этот английский источник не устанавливает российскую, израильскую, общеевропейскую или американскую процедуру утверждения.
где (часть страны): Англия и Уэльс
Это записанный контекст указанных источников, а не вывод о личном праве, исчерпывающей действующей норме или применимости к конкретному делу. Территория, даты, документы, факты сторон и исключения проверяются отдельно. Только Англия и Уэльс; не вся Великобритания. Нужны обычная подтверждённая part-scope возможность и свежий current-head CAS; расширение заголовка само по себе не разрешает публикацию.
нет в исходниках
первоисточник указан, цитата сверена 18.10.2026
Источник проверен в пределах записанного периода.
Проверка источника подтверждена; это не вывод о применимости права.
Дата проверки записи: 2026-10-18
Проверка исходного материала: 2026-10-18T17:30:35.088Z
Плановая перепроверка записи: 2027-10-18
Плановая перепроверка источника: 2027-10-18T17:30:35.088Z
Источники: 1, 2, 3, 4
Источники и цитаты
[1]
67. The issues raised on the facts of this case can be placed under three heads:
a. Were there circumstances attending the making of the agreement that
detract from the weight that should be accorded to it?
b. Were there circumstances attending the making of the agreement that
enhance the weight that should be accorded to it; the foreign element?
c. Did the circumstances prevailing when the court’s order was made
make it fair or just to depart from the agreement?
We shall have to consider these questions in the context of the facts of this case,
but at this stage we propose to address the issues of principle that they raise.
Page 27
Factors detracting from the weight to be accorded to the agreement
68. If an ante-nuptial agreement, or indeed a post-nuptial agreement, is to carry
full weight, both the husband and wife must enter into it of their own free will,
without undue influence or pressure, and informed of its implications. The third
and fifth of the six safeguards proposed in the consultation document (see para 5
above) were designed to ensure this. Baron J applied these safeguards, found that
they were not satisfied, and accorded the agreement reduced weight for this reason.
The Court of Appeal did not consider that the circumstances in which the
agreement was reached diminished the weight to be attached to it. In so far as the
safeguards were not strictly satisfied, this was not material on the particular facts
of this case.
69. The safeguards in the consultation document are designed to apply
regardless of the circumstances of the particular case, in order to ensure, inter alia,
that in all cases ante-nuptial contracts will not be binding unless they are freely
concluded and properly informed. It is necessary to have black and white rules of
this kind if agreements are otherwise to be binding. There is no need for them,
however, in the current state of the law. The safeguards in the consultation
document are likely to be highly relevant, but we consider that the Court of Appeal
was correct in principle to ask whether there was any material lack of disclosure,
information or advice. Sound legal advice is obviously desirable, for this will
ensure that a party understands the implications of the agreement, and full
disclosure of any assets owned by the other party may be necessary to ensure this.
But if it is clear that a party is fully aware of the implications of an ante-nuptial
agreement and indifferent to detailed particulars of the other party’s assets, there is
no need to accord the agreement reduced weight because he or she is unaware of
those particulars. What is important is that each party should have all the
information that is material to his or her decision, and that each party should intend
that the agreement should govern the financial consequences of the marriage
coming to an end.
70. It is, of course, important that each party should intend that the agreement
should be effective. In the past it may not have been right to infer from the fact of
the conclusion of the agreement that the parties intended it to take effect, for they
may have been advised that such agreements were void under English law and
likely to carry little or no weight. That will no longer be the case. As we have
shown the courts have recently been according weight, sometimes even decisive
weight, to ante-nuptial agreements and this judgment will confirm that they are
right to do so. Thus in future it will be natural to infer that parties who enter into
an ante-nuptial agreement to which English law is likely to be applied intend that
effect should be given to it.
Page 28
71. In relation to the circumstances attending the making of the nuptial
agreement, this comment of Ormrod LJ in Edgar v Edgar at p 1417, although
made about a separation agreement, is pertinent:
“It is not necessary in this connection to think in formal legal terms,
such as misrepresentation or estoppel; all the circumstances as they
affect each of two human beings must be considered in the complex
relationship of marriage.”
The first question will be whether any of the standard vitiating factors: duress,
fraud or misrepresentation, is present. Even if the agreement does not have
contractual force, those factors will negate any effect the agreement might
otherwise have. But unconscionable conduct such as undue pressure (falling short
of duress) will also be likely to eliminate the weight to be attached to the
agreement, and other unworthy conduct, such as exploitation of a dominant
position to secure an unfair advantage, would reduce or eliminate it.
72. The court may take into account a party’s emotional state, and what
pressures he or she was under to agree. But that again cannot be considered in
isolation from what would have happened had he or she not been under those
pressures. The circumstances of the parties at the time of the agreement will be
relevant. Those will include such matters as their age and maturity, whether either
or both had been married or been in long-term relationships before. For such
couples their experience of previous relationships may explain the terms of the
agreement, and may also show what they foresaw when they entered into the
agreement. What may not be easily foreseeable for less mature couples may well
be in contemplation of more mature couples. Another important factor may be
whether the marriage would have gone ahead without an agreement, or without the
terms which had been agreed. This may cut either way.
73. If the terms of the agreement are unfair from the start, this will reduce its
weight, although this question will be subsumed in practice in the question of
whether the agreement operates unfairly having regard to the circumstances
prevailing at the time of the breakdown of the marriage.
Factors enhancing the weight to be accorded to the agreement; the foreign
element
74. The issue raised under this heading is whether the foreign elements of a
case can enhance the weight to be given to an ante-nuptial agreement. In this case
the husband was French and the wife German and the agreement had a German
Page 29
law clause. We have already explained why we do not consider it material in
English ancillary relief proceedings whether the nuptial agreement under
consideration is or is not a contract. The court can overrule the agreement of the
parties, whether contractual or not, and applies the same criteria when considering
whether to do so. When dealing with agreements concluded in the past, and the
agreement in this case was concluded in 1998, foreign elements such as those in
this case may bear on the important question of whether or not the parties intended
their agreement to be effective. In the case of agreements made in recent times
and, a fortiori, any agreement made after this judgment, the question of whether
the parties intended their agreement to take effect is unlikely to be in issue, so
foreign law will not need to be considered in relation to that question.
Fairness
75. White v White and Miller v Miller establish that the overriding criterion to
be applied in ancillary relief proceedings is that of fairness and identify the three
strands of need, compensation and sharing that are relevant to the question of what
is fair. If an ante-nuptial agreement deals with those matters in a way that the court
might adopt absent such an agreement, there is no problem about giving effect to
the agreement. The problem arises where the agreement makes provisions that
conflict with what the court would otherwise consider to be the requirements of
fairness. The fact of the agreement is capable of altering what is fair. It is an
important factor to be weighed in the balance. We would advance the following
proposition, to be applied in the case of both ante- and post-nuptial agreements, in
preference to that suggested by the Board in MacLeod:
“The court should give effect to a nuptial agreement that is
freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of its
implications unless in the circumstances prevailing it would not
be fair to hold the parties to their agreement.”
76. That leaves outstanding the difficult question of the circumstances in which
it will not be fair to hold the parties to their agreement. This will necessarily
depend upon the facts of the particular case, and it would not be desirable to lay
down rules that would fetter the flexibility that the court requires to reach a fair
result. There is, however, some guidance that we believe that it is safe to give
directed to the situation where there are no tainting circumstances attending the
conclusion of the agreement.
Page 30
Children of the family
77. Section 25 of the 1973 Act provides that first consideration must be given
to the welfare while a minor of any child of the family who is under 18. A nuptial
agreement cannot be allowed to prejudice the reasonable requirements of any
children of the family.
Autonomy
78. The reason why the court should give weight to a nuptial agreement is that
there should be respect for individual autonomy. The court should accord respect
to the decision of a married couple as to the manner in which their financial affairs
should be regulated. It would be paternalistic and patronising to override their
agreement simply on the basis that the court knows best. This is particularly true
where the parties’ agreement addresses existing circumstances and not merely the
contingencies of an uncertain future.
Non-matrimonial property
79. Often parties to a marriage will be motivated in concluding a nuptial
agreement by a wish to make provision for existing property owned by one or
other, or property that one or other anticipates receiving from a third party. The
House of Lords in White v White and Miller v Miller drew a distinction between
such property and matrimonial property accumulated in the course of the marriage.
That distinction is particularly significant where the parties make express
agreement as to the disposal of such property in the event of the termination of the
marriage. There is nothing inherently unfair in such an agreement and there may
be good objective justification for it, such as obligations towards existing family
members. As Rix LJ put it at para 73
“…if the parties to a prospective marriage have something important
to agree with one another, then it is often much better, and more
honest, for that agreement to be made at the outset, before the
marriage, rather than left to become a source of disappointment or
acrimony within marriage.”
Future circumstances
80. Where the ante-nuptial agreement attempts to address the contingencies,
unknown and often unforeseen, of the couple’s future relationship there is more
Page 31
scope for what happens to them over the years to make it unfair to hold them to
their agreement. The circumstances of the parties often change over time in ways
or to an extent which either cannot be or simply was not envisaged. The longer the
marriage has lasted, the more likely it is that this will be the case. Once again we
quote from the judgment of Rix LJ at para 73.
“I have in mind (and in this respect there is no real difference
between an agreement made just before or just after a marriage) that
a pre-nuptial agreement is intended to look forward over the whole
period of a marriage to the possibility of its ultimate failure and
divorce: and thus it is potentially a longer lasting agreement than
almost any other (apart from a lease, and those are becoming shorter
and subject to optional break clauses). Over the potential many
decades of a marriage it is impossible to cater for the myriad
different circumstances which may await its parties. Thorpe LJ has
mentioned the very relevant case of a second marriage between
mature adults perhaps each with children of their own by their first
marriages. However, equally or more typical will be the marriage of
young persons, perhaps not yet adults, for whom the future is an
entirely open book. If in such a case a pre-nuptial agreement should
provide for no recovery by each spouse from the other in the event of
divorce, and the marriage should see the formation of a fortune
which each spouse had played an equal role in their different ways in
creating, but the fortune was in the hands for the most part of one
spouse rather than the other, would it be right to give the same
weight to their early agreement as in another perhaps very different
example?”
The answer to this question is, in the individual case, likely to be ‘no’.
81. Of the three strands identified in White v White and Miller v Miller, it is the
first two, needs and compensation, which can most readily render it unfair to hold
the parties to an ante-nuptial agreement. The parties are unlikely to have intended
that their ante-nuptial agreement should result, in the event of the marriage
breaking up, in one partner being left in a predicament of real need, while the other
enjoys a sufficiency or more, and such a result is likely to render it unfair to hold
the parties to their agreement. Equally if the devotion of one partner to looking
after the family and the home has left the other free to accumulate wealth, it is
likely to be unfair to hold the parties to an agreement that entitles the latter to
retain all that he or she has earned.
82. Where, however, these considerations do not apply and each party is in a
position to meet his or her needs, fairness may well not require a departure from
Page 32
their agreement as to the regulation of their financial affairs in the circumstances
that have come to pass. Thus it is in relation to the third strand, sharing, that the
court will be most likely to make an order in the terms of the nuptial agreement in
place of the order that it would otherwise have made.
83. So far as concerns the general approach of the court to ante-nuptial
agreements, Wilson LJ at para 130 endorsed the following comments of Baron J at
first instance
“111. I am certain that English courts are now much more ready to
attribute the appropriate (and, in the right case, decisive) weight to
an agreement as part of ‘all the circumstances of case’ [within the
meaning of section 25(1) of the Act of 1973] …
119. Upon divorce, when a party is seeking quantification of a claim
for financial relief, it is the court that determines the result after
applying the Act. The court grants the award and formulates the
order with the parties’ agreement being but one factor in the process
and perhaps, in the right case, it being the most compelling factor
…”
We also would endorse these comments.
supremecourt.uk
https://supremecourt.uk/uploads/uksc_2009_0031_judgment_db72197d25.pdf
Место в источнике: Radmacher [2010]UKSC42 paragraphs67–83 contiguous full context
Дата источника: —
Проверено: 2026-10-18
[2]
57. Is there a material distinction between ante-nuptial and post-nuptial agreements? Wilson LJ was not persuaded that there is (paras 125-126) and nor are we. The question should be tested by comparing an agreement concluded the day before the wedding with one concluded the day after it. Nuptial agreements made just after the wedding are not unknown and likely to become more common if the law distinguishes them from ante-nuptial agreements.
Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42 paragraph — UKSC [2010]42 majority paragraph 57, PDF page 26
https://supremecourt.uk/uploads/uksc_2009_0031_judgment_db72197d25.pdf
Место в источнике: UKSC [2010]42 majority paragraph 57, PDF page 26
Дата источника: 2010-10-20
Проверено: 2026-10-18
[3]
1. When a court grants a decree of divorce, nullity of marriage or judicial separation it has the power to order ancillary relief. Ancillary relief governs the financial arrangements between the husband and the wife on the breakdown of their marriage. Sometimes the husband and wife have already made an agreement governing these matters. The agreement may have been made before the marriage ("an ante-nuptial agreement") or after the marriage ("a post-nuptial agreement"). Post-nuptial agreements may be made when the husband and wife are still together and intend to remain together, or when they are on the point of separating or have already separated. The latter type of post-nuptial agreement can be described as "a separation agreement". We shall use the generic description "nuptial agreements" to embrace both ante-nuptial and post-nuptial agreements.
Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42 paragraph — UKSC [2010]42 majority paragraph 1, PDF page 3
https://supremecourt.uk/uploads/uksc_2009_0031_judgment_db72197d25.pdf
Место в источнике: UKSC [2010]42 majority paragraph 1, PDF page 3
Дата источника: 2010-10-20
Проверено: 2026-10-18
[4]
2. A court when considering the grant of ancillary relief is not obliged to give effect to nuptial agreements - whether they are ante-nuptial or post-nuptial. The parties cannot, by agreement, oust the jurisdiction of the court. The court must, however, give appropriate weight to such an agreement. This appeal raises the question of the principles to be applied by the court when considering the weight that should be attached to an ante-nuptial agreement. The Privy Council recently considered this question in relation to a post-nuptial agreement in MacLeod v MacLeod [2008] UKPC 64, [2010] 1 AC 298 and it will be necessary to consider the implications of that decision.
Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42 paragraph — UKSC [2010]42 majority paragraph 2, PDF page 3
https://supremecourt.uk/uploads/uksc_2009_0031_judgment_db72197d25.pdf
Место в источнике: UKSC [2010]42 majority paragraph 2, PDF page 3
Дата источника: 2010-10-20
Проверено: 2026-10-18
Актуальная редакция права: не установлена. Личная применимость и результат для конкретного случая не установлены.
Что нельзя написать в брачном договоре?
Только следующие указанные режимы: Великобритания
Какие пределы брачного соглашения описаны источниками Англии и Уэльса?
Записанные правила доступны; их применимость к этому случаю не подтверждена.
Зависит от: где (часть страны): Англия и Уэльс
Записанное положение 1
Соглашение не может исключить полномочия суда. Section25 требует учитывать все обстоятельства, отдавая первое внимание благополучию несовершеннолетних детей семьи; среди факторов — ресурсы, потребности, стандарт жизни, возраст и длительность брака, инвалидность, вклад в семью, значимое поведение и утрачиваемые выгоды. Radmacher не допускает ущемления разумных потребностей детей соглашением и сохраняет проверку потребностей, компенсации и справедливости на момент решения. Это не подтверждает универсальный запрет всех любых личных условий и не заменяет самостоятельные российские или немецкие нормы.
где (часть страны): Англия и Уэльс
Это записанный контекст указанных источников, а не вывод о личном праве, исчерпывающей действующей норме или применимости к конкретному делу. Территория, даты, документы, факты сторон и исключения проверяются отдельно. Только Англия и Уэльс; не вся Великобритания. Нужны обычная подтверждённая part-scope возможность и свежий current-head CAS; расширение заголовка само по себе не разрешает публикацию.
нет в исходниках
первоисточник указан, цитата сверена 18.10.2026
Источник проверен в пределах записанного периода.
Проверка источника подтверждена; это не вывод о применимости права.
Дата проверки записи: 2026-10-18
Проверка исходного материала: 2026-10-18T17:30:35.088Z
Плановая перепроверка записи: 2027-10-18
Плановая перепроверка источника: 2027-10-18T17:30:35.088Z
Источники: 1, 2, 3
Источники и цитаты
[1]
25 1 It shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether to exercise its powers under section 23, 24 , 24A , 24B or 24E above and, if so, in what manner, to have regard to all the circumstances of the case, first consideration being given to the welfare while a minor of any child of the family who has not attained the age of eighteen. 2 As regards the exercise of the powers of the court under section 23(1)(a), (b) or (c), 24 , 24A , 24B or 24E above in relation to a party to the marriage, the court shall in particular have regard to the following matters- a the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future, including in the case of earning capacity any increase in that capacity which it would in the opinion of the court be reasonable to expect a party to the marriage to take steps to acquire; b the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future; c the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage; d the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage; e any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage; f the contributions which each of the parties has made or is likely in the foreseeable future to make to the welfare of the family, including any contribution by looking after the home or caring for the family; g the conduct of each of the parties, if that conduct is such that it would in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it; h in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to each of the parties to the marriage of any benefit ... which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, that party will lose the chance of acquiring. 3 As regards the exercise of the powers of the court under section 23(1)(d), (e) or (f), (2) or (4), 24 or 24A above in relation to a child of the family, the court shall in particular have regard to the following matters- a the financial needs of the child; b the income, earning capacity (if any), property and other financial resources of the child; c any physical or mental disability of the child; d the manner in which he was being and in which the parties to the marriage expected him to be educated or trained; e the considerations mentioned in relation to the parties to the marriage in paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (e) of subsection (2) above. 4 As regards the exercise of the powers of the court under section 23(1)(d), (e) or (f), (2) or (4), 24 or 24A above against a party to a marriage in favour of a child of the family who is not the child of that party, the court shall also have regard- a to whether that party assumed any responsibility for the child's maintenance, and, if so, to the extent to which, and the basis upon which, that party assumed such responsibility and to the length of time for which that party discharged such responsibility; b to whether in assuming and discharging such responsibility that party did so knowing that the child was not his or her own; c to the liability of any other person to maintain the child.
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 section 25 — section25 P1 full current-served XML
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1973/18/section/25/data.xml
Место в источнике: section25 P1 full current-served XML
Дата источника: 1973-05-23
Проверено: 2026-10-18
[2]
67. The issues raised on the facts of this case can be placed under three heads:
a. Were there circumstances attending the making of the agreement that
detract from the weight that should be accorded to it?
b. Were there circumstances attending the making of the agreement that
enhance the weight that should be accorded to it; the foreign element?
c. Did the circumstances prevailing when the court’s order was made
make it fair or just to depart from the agreement?
We shall have to consider these questions in the context of the facts of this case,
but at this stage we propose to address the issues of principle that they raise.
Page 27
Factors detracting from the weight to be accorded to the agreement
68. If an ante-nuptial agreement, or indeed a post-nuptial agreement, is to carry
full weight, both the husband and wife must enter into it of their own free will,
without undue influence or pressure, and informed of its implications. The third
and fifth of the six safeguards proposed in the consultation document (see para 5
above) were designed to ensure this. Baron J applied these safeguards, found that
they were not satisfied, and accorded the agreement reduced weight for this reason.
The Court of Appeal did not consider that the circumstances in which the
agreement was reached diminished the weight to be attached to it. In so far as the
safeguards were not strictly satisfied, this was not material on the particular facts
of this case.
69. The safeguards in the consultation document are designed to apply
regardless of the circumstances of the particular case, in order to ensure, inter alia,
that in all cases ante-nuptial contracts will not be binding unless they are freely
concluded and properly informed. It is necessary to have black and white rules of
this kind if agreements are otherwise to be binding. There is no need for them,
however, in the current state of the law. The safeguards in the consultation
document are likely to be highly relevant, but we consider that the Court of Appeal
was correct in principle to ask whether there was any material lack of disclosure,
information or advice. Sound legal advice is obviously desirable, for this will
ensure that a party understands the implications of the agreement, and full
disclosure of any assets owned by the other party may be necessary to ensure this.
But if it is clear that a party is fully aware of the implications of an ante-nuptial
agreement and indifferent to detailed particulars of the other party’s assets, there is
no need to accord the agreement reduced weight because he or she is unaware of
those particulars. What is important is that each party should have all the
information that is material to his or her decision, and that each party should intend
that the agreement should govern the financial consequences of the marriage
coming to an end.
70. It is, of course, important that each party should intend that the agreement
should be effective. In the past it may not have been right to infer from the fact of
the conclusion of the agreement that the parties intended it to take effect, for they
may have been advised that such agreements were void under English law and
likely to carry little or no weight. That will no longer be the case. As we have
shown the courts have recently been according weight, sometimes even decisive
weight, to ante-nuptial agreements and this judgment will confirm that they are
right to do so. Thus in future it will be natural to infer that parties who enter into
an ante-nuptial agreement to which English law is likely to be applied intend that
effect should be given to it.
Page 28
71. In relation to the circumstances attending the making of the nuptial
agreement, this comment of Ormrod LJ in Edgar v Edgar at p 1417, although
made about a separation agreement, is pertinent:
“It is not necessary in this connection to think in formal legal terms,
such as misrepresentation or estoppel; all the circumstances as they
affect each of two human beings must be considered in the complex
relationship of marriage.”
The first question will be whether any of the standard vitiating factors: duress,
fraud or misrepresentation, is present. Even if the agreement does not have
contractual force, those factors will negate any effect the agreement might
otherwise have. But unconscionable conduct such as undue pressure (falling short
of duress) will also be likely to eliminate the weight to be attached to the
agreement, and other unworthy conduct, such as exploitation of a dominant
position to secure an unfair advantage, would reduce or eliminate it.
72. The court may take into account a party’s emotional state, and what
pressures he or she was under to agree. But that again cannot be considered in
isolation from what would have happened had he or she not been under those
pressures. The circumstances of the parties at the time of the agreement will be
relevant. Those will include such matters as their age and maturity, whether either
or both had been married or been in long-term relationships before. For such
couples their experience of previous relationships may explain the terms of the
agreement, and may also show what they foresaw when they entered into the
agreement. What may not be easily foreseeable for less mature couples may well
be in contemplation of more mature couples. Another important factor may be
whether the marriage would have gone ahead without an agreement, or without the
terms which had been agreed. This may cut either way.
73. If the terms of the agreement are unfair from the start, this will reduce its
weight, although this question will be subsumed in practice in the question of
whether the agreement operates unfairly having regard to the circumstances
prevailing at the time of the breakdown of the marriage.
Factors enhancing the weight to be accorded to the agreement; the foreign
element
74. The issue raised under this heading is whether the foreign elements of a
case can enhance the weight to be given to an ante-nuptial agreement. In this case
the husband was French and the wife German and the agreement had a German
Page 29
law clause. We have already explained why we do not consider it material in
English ancillary relief proceedings whether the nuptial agreement under
consideration is or is not a contract. The court can overrule the agreement of the
parties, whether contractual or not, and applies the same criteria when considering
whether to do so. When dealing with agreements concluded in the past, and the
agreement in this case was concluded in 1998, foreign elements such as those in
this case may bear on the important question of whether or not the parties intended
their agreement to be effective. In the case of agreements made in recent times
and, a fortiori, any agreement made after this judgment, the question of whether
the parties intended their agreement to take effect is unlikely to be in issue, so
foreign law will not need to be considered in relation to that question.
Fairness
75. White v White and Miller v Miller establish that the overriding criterion to
be applied in ancillary relief proceedings is that of fairness and identify the three
strands of need, compensation and sharing that are relevant to the question of what
is fair. If an ante-nuptial agreement deals with those matters in a way that the court
might adopt absent such an agreement, there is no problem about giving effect to
the agreement. The problem arises where the agreement makes provisions that
conflict with what the court would otherwise consider to be the requirements of
fairness. The fact of the agreement is capable of altering what is fair. It is an
important factor to be weighed in the balance. We would advance the following
proposition, to be applied in the case of both ante- and post-nuptial agreements, in
preference to that suggested by the Board in MacLeod:
“The court should give effect to a nuptial agreement that is
freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of its
implications unless in the circumstances prevailing it would not
be fair to hold the parties to their agreement.”
76. That leaves outstanding the difficult question of the circumstances in which
it will not be fair to hold the parties to their agreement. This will necessarily
depend upon the facts of the particular case, and it would not be desirable to lay
down rules that would fetter the flexibility that the court requires to reach a fair
result. There is, however, some guidance that we believe that it is safe to give
directed to the situation where there are no tainting circumstances attending the
conclusion of the agreement.
Page 30
Children of the family
77. Section 25 of the 1973 Act provides that first consideration must be given
to the welfare while a minor of any child of the family who is under 18. A nuptial
agreement cannot be allowed to prejudice the reasonable requirements of any
children of the family.
Autonomy
78. The reason why the court should give weight to a nuptial agreement is that
there should be respect for individual autonomy. The court should accord respect
to the decision of a married couple as to the manner in which their financial affairs
should be regulated. It would be paternalistic and patronising to override their
agreement simply on the basis that the court knows best. This is particularly true
where the parties’ agreement addresses existing circumstances and not merely the
contingencies of an uncertain future.
Non-matrimonial property
79. Often parties to a marriage will be motivated in concluding a nuptial
agreement by a wish to make provision for existing property owned by one or
other, or property that one or other anticipates receiving from a third party. The
House of Lords in White v White and Miller v Miller drew a distinction between
such property and matrimonial property accumulated in the course of the marriage.
That distinction is particularly significant where the parties make express
agreement as to the disposal of such property in the event of the termination of the
marriage. There is nothing inherently unfair in such an agreement and there may
be good objective justification for it, such as obligations towards existing family
members. As Rix LJ put it at para 73
“…if the parties to a prospective marriage have something important
to agree with one another, then it is often much better, and more
honest, for that agreement to be made at the outset, before the
marriage, rather than left to become a source of disappointment or
acrimony within marriage.”
Future circumstances
80. Where the ante-nuptial agreement attempts to address the contingencies,
unknown and often unforeseen, of the couple’s future relationship there is more
Page 31
scope for what happens to them over the years to make it unfair to hold them to
their agreement. The circumstances of the parties often change over time in ways
or to an extent which either cannot be or simply was not envisaged. The longer the
marriage has lasted, the more likely it is that this will be the case. Once again we
quote from the judgment of Rix LJ at para 73.
“I have in mind (and in this respect there is no real difference
between an agreement made just before or just after a marriage) that
a pre-nuptial agreement is intended to look forward over the whole
period of a marriage to the possibility of its ultimate failure and
divorce: and thus it is potentially a longer lasting agreement than
almost any other (apart from a lease, and those are becoming shorter
and subject to optional break clauses). Over the potential many
decades of a marriage it is impossible to cater for the myriad
different circumstances which may await its parties. Thorpe LJ has
mentioned the very relevant case of a second marriage between
mature adults perhaps each with children of their own by their first
marriages. However, equally or more typical will be the marriage of
young persons, perhaps not yet adults, for whom the future is an
entirely open book. If in such a case a pre-nuptial agreement should
provide for no recovery by each spouse from the other in the event of
divorce, and the marriage should see the formation of a fortune
which each spouse had played an equal role in their different ways in
creating, but the fortune was in the hands for the most part of one
spouse rather than the other, would it be right to give the same
weight to their early agreement as in another perhaps very different
example?”
The answer to this question is, in the individual case, likely to be ‘no’.
81. Of the three strands identified in White v White and Miller v Miller, it is the
first two, needs and compensation, which can most readily render it unfair to hold
the parties to an ante-nuptial agreement. The parties are unlikely to have intended
that their ante-nuptial agreement should result, in the event of the marriage
breaking up, in one partner being left in a predicament of real need, while the other
enjoys a sufficiency or more, and such a result is likely to render it unfair to hold
the parties to their agreement. Equally if the devotion of one partner to looking
after the family and the home has left the other free to accumulate wealth, it is
likely to be unfair to hold the parties to an agreement that entitles the latter to
retain all that he or she has earned.
82. Where, however, these considerations do not apply and each party is in a
position to meet his or her needs, fairness may well not require a departure from
Page 32
their agreement as to the regulation of their financial affairs in the circumstances
that have come to pass. Thus it is in relation to the third strand, sharing, that the
court will be most likely to make an order in the terms of the nuptial agreement in
place of the order that it would otherwise have made.
83. So far as concerns the general approach of the court to ante-nuptial
agreements, Wilson LJ at para 130 endorsed the following comments of Baron J at
first instance
“111. I am certain that English courts are now much more ready to
attribute the appropriate (and, in the right case, decisive) weight to
an agreement as part of ‘all the circumstances of case’ [within the
meaning of section 25(1) of the Act of 1973] …
119. Upon divorce, when a party is seeking quantification of a claim
for financial relief, it is the court that determines the result after
applying the Act. The court grants the award and formulates the
order with the parties’ agreement being but one factor in the process
and perhaps, in the right case, it being the most compelling factor
…”
We also would endorse these comments.
supremecourt.uk
https://supremecourt.uk/uploads/uksc_2009_0031_judgment_db72197d25.pdf
Место в источнике: Radmacher [2010]UKSC42 paragraphs67–83 contiguous full context
Дата источника: —
Проверено: 2026-10-18
[3]
2. A court when considering the grant of ancillary relief is not obliged to give effect to nuptial agreements - whether they are ante-nuptial or post-nuptial. The parties cannot, by agreement, oust the jurisdiction of the court. The court must, however, give appropriate weight to such an agreement. This appeal raises the question of the principles to be applied by the court when considering the weight that should be attached to an ante-nuptial agreement. The Privy Council recently considered this question in relation to a post-nuptial agreement in MacLeod v MacLeod [2008] UKPC 64, [2010] 1 AC 298 and it will be necessary to consider the implications of that decision.
Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42 paragraph — UKSC [2010]42 majority paragraph 2, PDF page 3
https://supremecourt.uk/uploads/uksc_2009_0031_judgment_db72197d25.pdf
Место в источнике: UKSC [2010]42 majority paragraph 2, PDF page 3
Дата источника: 2010-10-20
Проверено: 2026-10-18
Актуальная редакция права: не установлена. Личная применимость и результат для конкретного случая не установлены.
Зачем договор, если все активы оформлены на меня?
Только следующие указанные режимы: Великобритания
Почему титул на одного супруга не заменяет анализ финансового решения в Англии и Уэльсе?
Записанные правила доступны; их применимость к этому случаю не подтверждена.
Зависит от: где (часть страны): Англия и Уэльс
Записанное положение 1
В описанном английском контексте суд оценивает ресурсы обоих супругов и обстоятельства по section25, а не получает готовый результат из имени в реестре. Radmacher различает имущество, существовавшее до брака или полученное извне, и накопленное в браке; соглашение может иметь значительный вес, но потребности и компенсация могут сделать удержание его условий несправедливым. Это не устанавливает автоматическое деление любого имущества пополам, автоматическое изъятие добрачного актива или единственность договора как способа планирования. Для российских, французских и испанских режимов нужны собственные нормы и конкретные условия приобретения.
где (часть страны): Англия и Уэльс
Это записанный контекст указанных источников, а не вывод о личном праве, исчерпывающей действующей норме или применимости к конкретному делу. Территория, даты, документы, факты сторон и исключения проверяются отдельно. Только Англия и Уэльс; не вся Великобритания. Нужны обычная подтверждённая part-scope возможность и свежий current-head CAS; расширение заголовка само по себе не разрешает публикацию.
нет в исходниках
первоисточник указан, цитата сверена 18.10.2026
Источник проверен в пределах записанного периода.
Проверка источника подтверждена; это не вывод о применимости права.
Дата проверки записи: 2026-10-18
Проверка исходного материала: 2026-10-18T17:30:35.088Z
Плановая перепроверка записи: 2027-10-18
Плановая перепроверка источника: 2027-10-18T17:30:35.088Z
Источники: 1, 2
Источники и цитаты
[1]
25 1 It shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether to exercise its powers under section 23, 24 , 24A , 24B or 24E above and, if so, in what manner, to have regard to all the circumstances of the case, first consideration being given to the welfare while a minor of any child of the family who has not attained the age of eighteen. 2 As regards the exercise of the powers of the court under section 23(1)(a), (b) or (c), 24 , 24A , 24B or 24E above in relation to a party to the marriage, the court shall in particular have regard to the following matters- a the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future, including in the case of earning capacity any increase in that capacity which it would in the opinion of the court be reasonable to expect a party to the marriage to take steps to acquire; b the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future; c the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage; d the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage; e any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage; f the contributions which each of the parties has made or is likely in the foreseeable future to make to the welfare of the family, including any contribution by looking after the home or caring for the family; g the conduct of each of the parties, if that conduct is such that it would in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it; h in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to each of the parties to the marriage of any benefit ... which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, that party will lose the chance of acquiring. 3 As regards the exercise of the powers of the court under section 23(1)(d), (e) or (f), (2) or (4), 24 or 24A above in relation to a child of the family, the court shall in particular have regard to the following matters- a the financial needs of the child; b the income, earning capacity (if any), property and other financial resources of the child; c any physical or mental disability of the child; d the manner in which he was being and in which the parties to the marriage expected him to be educated or trained; e the considerations mentioned in relation to the parties to the marriage in paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (e) of subsection (2) above. 4 As regards the exercise of the powers of the court under section 23(1)(d), (e) or (f), (2) or (4), 24 or 24A above against a party to a marriage in favour of a child of the family who is not the child of that party, the court shall also have regard- a to whether that party assumed any responsibility for the child's maintenance, and, if so, to the extent to which, and the basis upon which, that party assumed such responsibility and to the length of time for which that party discharged such responsibility; b to whether in assuming and discharging such responsibility that party did so knowing that the child was not his or her own; c to the liability of any other person to maintain the child.
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 section 25 — section25 P1 full current-served XML
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1973/18/section/25/data.xml
Место в источнике: section25 P1 full current-served XML
Дата источника: 1973-05-23
Проверено: 2026-10-18
[2]
67. The issues raised on the facts of this case can be placed under three heads:
a. Were there circumstances attending the making of the agreement that
detract from the weight that should be accorded to it?
b. Were there circumstances attending the making of the agreement that
enhance the weight that should be accorded to it; the foreign element?
c. Did the circumstances prevailing when the court’s order was made
make it fair or just to depart from the agreement?
We shall have to consider these questions in the context of the facts of this case,
but at this stage we propose to address the issues of principle that they raise.
Page 27
Factors detracting from the weight to be accorded to the agreement
68. If an ante-nuptial agreement, or indeed a post-nuptial agreement, is to carry
full weight, both the husband and wife must enter into it of their own free will,
without undue influence or pressure, and informed of its implications. The third
and fifth of the six safeguards proposed in the consultation document (see para 5
above) were designed to ensure this. Baron J applied these safeguards, found that
they were not satisfied, and accorded the agreement reduced weight for this reason.
The Court of Appeal did not consider that the circumstances in which the
agreement was reached diminished the weight to be attached to it. In so far as the
safeguards were not strictly satisfied, this was not material on the particular facts
of this case.
69. The safeguards in the consultation document are designed to apply
regardless of the circumstances of the particular case, in order to ensure, inter alia,
that in all cases ante-nuptial contracts will not be binding unless they are freely
concluded and properly informed. It is necessary to have black and white rules of
this kind if agreements are otherwise to be binding. There is no need for them,
however, in the current state of the law. The safeguards in the consultation
document are likely to be highly relevant, but we consider that the Court of Appeal
was correct in principle to ask whether there was any material lack of disclosure,
information or advice. Sound legal advice is obviously desirable, for this will
ensure that a party understands the implications of the agreement, and full
disclosure of any assets owned by the other party may be necessary to ensure this.
But if it is clear that a party is fully aware of the implications of an ante-nuptial
agreement and indifferent to detailed particulars of the other party’s assets, there is
no need to accord the agreement reduced weight because he or she is unaware of
those particulars. What is important is that each party should have all the
information that is material to his or her decision, and that each party should intend
that the agreement should govern the financial consequences of the marriage
coming to an end.
70. It is, of course, important that each party should intend that the agreement
should be effective. In the past it may not have been right to infer from the fact of
the conclusion of the agreement that the parties intended it to take effect, for they
may have been advised that such agreements were void under English law and
likely to carry little or no weight. That will no longer be the case. As we have
shown the courts have recently been according weight, sometimes even decisive
weight, to ante-nuptial agreements and this judgment will confirm that they are
right to do so. Thus in future it will be natural to infer that parties who enter into
an ante-nuptial agreement to which English law is likely to be applied intend that
effect should be given to it.
Page 28
71. In relation to the circumstances attending the making of the nuptial
agreement, this comment of Ormrod LJ in Edgar v Edgar at p 1417, although
made about a separation agreement, is pertinent:
“It is not necessary in this connection to think in formal legal terms,
such as misrepresentation or estoppel; all the circumstances as they
affect each of two human beings must be considered in the complex
relationship of marriage.”
The first question will be whether any of the standard vitiating factors: duress,
fraud or misrepresentation, is present. Even if the agreement does not have
contractual force, those factors will negate any effect the agreement might
otherwise have. But unconscionable conduct such as undue pressure (falling short
of duress) will also be likely to eliminate the weight to be attached to the
agreement, and other unworthy conduct, such as exploitation of a dominant
position to secure an unfair advantage, would reduce or eliminate it.
72. The court may take into account a party’s emotional state, and what
pressures he or she was under to agree. But that again cannot be considered in
isolation from what would have happened had he or she not been under those
pressures. The circumstances of the parties at the time of the agreement will be
relevant. Those will include such matters as their age and maturity, whether either
or both had been married or been in long-term relationships before. For such
couples their experience of previous relationships may explain the terms of the
agreement, and may also show what they foresaw when they entered into the
agreement. What may not be easily foreseeable for less mature couples may well
be in contemplation of more mature couples. Another important factor may be
whether the marriage would have gone ahead without an agreement, or without the
terms which had been agreed. This may cut either way.
73. If the terms of the agreement are unfair from the start, this will reduce its
weight, although this question will be subsumed in practice in the question of
whether the agreement operates unfairly having regard to the circumstances
prevailing at the time of the breakdown of the marriage.
Factors enhancing the weight to be accorded to the agreement; the foreign
element
74. The issue raised under this heading is whether the foreign elements of a
case can enhance the weight to be given to an ante-nuptial agreement. In this case
the husband was French and the wife German and the agreement had a German
Page 29
law clause. We have already explained why we do not consider it material in
English ancillary relief proceedings whether the nuptial agreement under
consideration is or is not a contract. The court can overrule the agreement of the
parties, whether contractual or not, and applies the same criteria when considering
whether to do so. When dealing with agreements concluded in the past, and the
agreement in this case was concluded in 1998, foreign elements such as those in
this case may bear on the important question of whether or not the parties intended
their agreement to be effective. In the case of agreements made in recent times
and, a fortiori, any agreement made after this judgment, the question of whether
the parties intended their agreement to take effect is unlikely to be in issue, so
foreign law will not need to be considered in relation to that question.
Fairness
75. White v White and Miller v Miller establish that the overriding criterion to
be applied in ancillary relief proceedings is that of fairness and identify the three
strands of need, compensation and sharing that are relevant to the question of what
is fair. If an ante-nuptial agreement deals with those matters in a way that the court
might adopt absent such an agreement, there is no problem about giving effect to
the agreement. The problem arises where the agreement makes provisions that
conflict with what the court would otherwise consider to be the requirements of
fairness. The fact of the agreement is capable of altering what is fair. It is an
important factor to be weighed in the balance. We would advance the following
proposition, to be applied in the case of both ante- and post-nuptial agreements, in
preference to that suggested by the Board in MacLeod:
“The court should give effect to a nuptial agreement that is
freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of its
implications unless in the circumstances prevailing it would not
be fair to hold the parties to their agreement.”
76. That leaves outstanding the difficult question of the circumstances in which
it will not be fair to hold the parties to their agreement. This will necessarily
depend upon the facts of the particular case, and it would not be desirable to lay
down rules that would fetter the flexibility that the court requires to reach a fair
result. There is, however, some guidance that we believe that it is safe to give
directed to the situation where there are no tainting circumstances attending the
conclusion of the agreement.
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Children of the family
77. Section 25 of the 1973 Act provides that first consideration must be given
to the welfare while a minor of any child of the family who is under 18. A nuptial
agreement cannot be allowed to prejudice the reasonable requirements of any
children of the family.
Autonomy
78. The reason why the court should give weight to a nuptial agreement is that
there should be respect for individual autonomy. The court should accord respect
to the decision of a married couple as to the manner in which their financial affairs
should be regulated. It would be paternalistic and patronising to override their
agreement simply on the basis that the court knows best. This is particularly true
where the parties’ agreement addresses existing circumstances and not merely the
contingencies of an uncertain future.
Non-matrimonial property
79. Often parties to a marriage will be motivated in concluding a nuptial
agreement by a wish to make provision for existing property owned by one or
other, or property that one or other anticipates receiving from a third party. The
House of Lords in White v White and Miller v Miller drew a distinction between
such property and matrimonial property accumulated in the course of the marriage.
That distinction is particularly significant where the parties make express
agreement as to the disposal of such property in the event of the termination of the
marriage. There is nothing inherently unfair in such an agreement and there may
be good objective justification for it, such as obligations towards existing family
members. As Rix LJ put it at para 73
“…if the parties to a prospective marriage have something important
to agree with one another, then it is often much better, and more
honest, for that agreement to be made at the outset, before the
marriage, rather than left to become a source of disappointment or
acrimony within marriage.”
Future circumstances
80. Where the ante-nuptial agreement attempts to address the contingencies,
unknown and often unforeseen, of the couple’s future relationship there is more
Page 31
scope for what happens to them over the years to make it unfair to hold them to
their agreement. The circumstances of the parties often change over time in ways
or to an extent which either cannot be or simply was not envisaged. The longer the
marriage has lasted, the more likely it is that this will be the case. Once again we
quote from the judgment of Rix LJ at para 73.
“I have in mind (and in this respect there is no real difference
between an agreement made just before or just after a marriage) that
a pre-nuptial agreement is intended to look forward over the whole
period of a marriage to the possibility of its ultimate failure and
divorce: and thus it is potentially a longer lasting agreement than
almost any other (apart from a lease, and those are becoming shorter
and subject to optional break clauses). Over the potential many
decades of a marriage it is impossible to cater for the myriad
different circumstances which may await its parties. Thorpe LJ has
mentioned the very relevant case of a second marriage between
mature adults perhaps each with children of their own by their first
marriages. However, equally or more typical will be the marriage of
young persons, perhaps not yet adults, for whom the future is an
entirely open book. If in such a case a pre-nuptial agreement should
provide for no recovery by each spouse from the other in the event of
divorce, and the marriage should see the formation of a fortune
which each spouse had played an equal role in their different ways in
creating, but the fortune was in the hands for the most part of one
spouse rather than the other, would it be right to give the same
weight to their early agreement as in another perhaps very different
example?”
The answer to this question is, in the individual case, likely to be ‘no’.
81. Of the three strands identified in White v White and Miller v Miller, it is the
first two, needs and compensation, which can most readily render it unfair to hold
the parties to an ante-nuptial agreement. The parties are unlikely to have intended
that their ante-nuptial agreement should result, in the event of the marriage
breaking up, in one partner being left in a predicament of real need, while the other
enjoys a sufficiency or more, and such a result is likely to render it unfair to hold
the parties to their agreement. Equally if the devotion of one partner to looking
after the family and the home has left the other free to accumulate wealth, it is
likely to be unfair to hold the parties to an agreement that entitles the latter to
retain all that he or she has earned.
82. Where, however, these considerations do not apply and each party is in a
position to meet his or her needs, fairness may well not require a departure from
Page 32
their agreement as to the regulation of their financial affairs in the circumstances
that have come to pass. Thus it is in relation to the third strand, sharing, that the
court will be most likely to make an order in the terms of the nuptial agreement in
place of the order that it would otherwise have made.
83. So far as concerns the general approach of the court to ante-nuptial
agreements, Wilson LJ at para 130 endorsed the following comments of Baron J at
first instance
“111. I am certain that English courts are now much more ready to
attribute the appropriate (and, in the right case, decisive) weight to
an agreement as part of ‘all the circumstances of case’ [within the
meaning of section 25(1) of the Act of 1973] …
119. Upon divorce, when a party is seeking quantification of a claim
for financial relief, it is the court that determines the result after
applying the Act. The court grants the award and formulates the
order with the parties’ agreement being but one factor in the process
and perhaps, in the right case, it being the most compelling factor
…”
We also would endorse these comments.
supremecourt.uk
https://supremecourt.uk/uploads/uksc_2009_0031_judgment_db72197d25.pdf
Место в источнике: Radmacher [2010]UKSC42 paragraphs67–83 contiguous full context
Дата источника: —
Проверено: 2026-10-18
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