# Remittances from Russia: Why Corridors Close and How to Check a Route

> The four mechanisms that close a remittance corridor into or out of Russia, and a repeatable procedure for checking a route's status on a given date.

Author: Ksenia Voronova — Lawyer, Family Office (https://wiki.private.law/en/authors/voronova)
Last modified: 2026-08-31T19:18:00.000Z
Canonical: https://wiki.private.law/en/remittances-from-russia
Topics: banking
Jurisdictions: russia, global
Product tags: banking, compliance
Semantic tags: banking, compliance

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A list of working corridors goes stale faster than it can be published. Providers change their destination maps more often than they announce it, and any "where you can send money" table is valid only on its observation date. What is useful instead is two things: an understanding of what actually closes a corridor, and a repeatable procedure for checking a route's status.

The second thing to separate from the first step is the brand from the licensee. One storefront usually sits on several independent legal entities in different jurisdictions, with different regulators, different governing law and different protection for client money. Sanctions listings, licence withdrawals and insolvency happen to a legal entity, not to a logo.

## Concept: a corridor is the intersection of four filters

A transfer with a Russian element passes four independent controls, and each runs on its own calendar.

The first is the sanctions status of the operator itself — that is, of a specific licensed legal entity. The second is the risk appetite of the bank that issued the sender's card and of the bank or payout agent on the recipient's side. The third is the rules of the destination country and its payments market: permitted currencies, payout methods, identification requirements. The fourth is the currency and limit regime on both sides.

A corridor is alive only while all four filters are open at once, and one closure is enough to end it. The practical consequence follows: "the service works" and "this corridor works today" are different statements, and the first does not prove the second. An active licence in a regulator's register says nothing about whether a particular transfer will go through either.

## Four mechanisms that close a corridor

### A direct sanctions listing of the operator

The fastest and most visible scenario. KoronaPay's Russian operator — RNKO Payment Center \(LLC\), Novosibirsk, Bank of Russia licence No. 3166-K, OGRN 1025400002968 — is listed in Council Implementing Regulation \(EU\) 2026/1843, the EU's 21st sanctions package adopted on 23 July 2026. The European leg of the service ran through a separate entity, Koronapay Europe Limited \(Cyprus, registration HE375955\), holding electronic money institution licence No. 115.1.3.30 from the Central Bank of Cyprus.

The mechanics then show themselves: the Cypriot licence formally exists, yet on 14 August 2026 the European service page stated that new transfers were unavailable and offered refunds of earlier ones. From Russia on the same date the official page listed China, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey and Uzbekistan, and warned expressly that the set could change. The conclusion from this mechanism matters more than any corridor list: holding a licence does not mean a transfer is actually available.

### A provider leaving a jurisdiction without announcing it

The second scenario runs quietly and is therefore more dangerous. As at 28 August 2026 the Russian-language version of the Paysend site serves the generic global page — with no licence line for the Russian non-bank credit organisation and no mention of the Avosend brand — and Russia appears in the supported-country list neither for sending nor for receiving. The previous revision of this material cited the Bank of Russia licence precisely from the footer of the Russian version of the Paysend site; it is no longer there.

The service itself is live: Avosend's operator is NKO Platezhi i Raschety \(JSC\), tax number 6316049606, Samara, under Bank of Russia licence No. 3324-R of 12 January 2018, the same licence appearing in the Bank of Russia credit institutions directory. Neither site claims a group link between Avosend and Paysend on that date, so the accurate description is two independent regulated operators in different jurisdictions with different protection regimes. The practical conclusion: a licence line vanishing from a footer is the same kind of event as a sanctions listing, only without a publication and without a date.

### Secondary sanctions at the receiving end

The third mechanism fires not at the transfer operator at all but at the bank that must accept the money. Executive Order 14114 of 22 December 2023, which amended Executive Order 14024, gave OFAC two instruments against a foreign financial institution: blocking sanctions, or a prohibition or conditions on maintaining United States correspondent accounts — the trigger being a finding of a significant transaction involving Russia's military-industrial base. A foreign bank is under no formal duty to apply the American rule; it faces the risk of losing dollar settlement, and in practice that weighs more.

The result is visible in dates. Major Turkish banks stopped accepting Mir cards in the autumn of 2022 after United States guidance addressed to foreign financial institutions; in July 2025 the EU listed two Chinese regional banks for the first time — Heihe Rural Commercial Bank and Suifenhe Rural Commercial Bank. A bank at the receiving end narrows its acceptance of Russian payments long before appearing on any list, and the decision is taken by its compliance function rather than by a legislator; the Turkish version of this story is covered in the material on [banking in Turkey](https://wiki.private.law/en/turkey-banks).

### A quiet suspension of individual countries

The fourth scenario is granular and routine. On Paysend's own pages, Albania and Bosnia were flagged as temporarily unavailable as at 28 August 2026; KoronaPay attaches a standing caveat that its list can change. Neither comes with a customer notice, and both are discovered at the payment stage or afterwards, through a refund.

## How to check a route's status on a date

The procedure is repeatable, and the order inside it matters: the first three steps are cheap and eliminate most dead routes before any money moves.

1. **Establish the legal entity, not the brand.** The operator is named in the site footer and in the customer terms, and one brand usually has several, assigned by the customer's country of residence. Every later check runs against that entity's name.
2. **Open the regulator's register rather than a press release.** A Russian NKO is verified in the Bank of Russia credit institutions directory, a UK electronic money issuer in the FCA register file by its FRN, an Irish one in the Central Bank of Ireland register by firm reference, a Cypriot one in the Central Bank of Cyprus register. A site footer is not a source of status: it both changes and disappears.
3. **Check the sanctions lists at source, by the entity's name.** The EU consolidated list under Regulations 269/2014 and 833/2014, the United States SDN List, the UK Sanctions List, the SECO list. Overlap between them is incomplete, and that is the normal state rather than an error by one regulator; the reading order is set by the [sanctions map](https://wiki.private.law/en/sanctions-map).
4. **Read the operator's destinations page and record the observation date.** The trap here is technical: public sites are geo-dependent, and KoronaPay's exact limits are shown only in the app, not on the website.
5. **Check both ends of the route.** The bank that issued the sender's card and the bank or payout agent serving the recipient are independent filters; a corridor closes at either of them regardless of the operator.
6. **Send a small test transfer.** It tests exactly what no register shows — whether the chain will execute this particular operation today.
> ⚙️ The record-keeping rule that saves the most time: every statement about availability is stored together with its observation date. "KoronaPay serves Turkey" is not a fact; "on 14.08.2026 the official service page listed Turkey" is a fact with a shelf life and an owner who has to recheck it.

## Who actually holds the licence behind the brand

The storefront looks alike across these contours — an app, a card, a rate shown before confirmation — while the legal construction underneath differs: a different regulator, different governing law, different protection for the money and a different mechanism by which the route closes. The details below were checked against regulator registers and provider sites at the end of August 2026.

| **Contour and brand** | **Legal entity** | **Regulator and licence reference** | **Protection of client money** | **What closes the route** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Russia → outbound corridors, KoronaPay | RNKO Payment Center \(LLC\), Novosibirsk, OGRN 1025400002968; technology operator ZAO Zolotaya Korona | Bank of Russia, licence No. 3166-K | Transfer without opening an account; no deposit insurance | Sanctions listing of the operator: Council Implementing Regulation \(EU\) 2026/1843, the 21st package of 23.07.2026 |
| Europe → Russia, KoronaPay Europe | Koronapay Europe Limited, Cyprus, registration HE375955 | Central Bank of Cyprus, electronic money institution licence No. 115.1.3.30 | E-money regime: safeguarding, not deposit insurance | Already closed: as at 14.08.2026 no new transfers are accepted and only refunds are processed |
| Russia → Uzbekistan and other corridors, Avosend | NKO Platezhi i Raschety \(JSC\), Samara, tax number 6316049606 | Bank of Russia, licence No. 3324-R of 12.01.2018 | Transfer without opening an account; no deposit insurance | Operator limits and card-issuer policy; neither site claims a group link with Paysend |
| United Kingdom and most other territories, Paysend | Paysend Plc, Scotland, SC376020, incorporated 31.03.2010 in Edinburgh | FCA, FRN 900004, e-money status effective 02.02.2018 | Safeguarding outside the FSCS: an asset pool in a special administration | Russia absent from coverage as at 28.08.2026; individual countries flagged unavailable without notice |
| EEA, Paysend | Paysend EU DAC, Ireland, 678642; until a per-customer notice, the customer is served by Easy Payment and Finance EP SA, Spain, A85785905 | Central Bank of Ireland, firm reference C443739; Bank of Spain, payment institution licence No. 6849 | Safeguarding outside the Irish Deposit Guarantee Scheme | Moving between entities changes the governing law and the complaints route |
| United States, Paysend | Paysend US LLC, Miami; in unlicensed states the service is provided by the partner bank Central Bank of Kansas City, with Cross River Bank also named in the footer | State money transmitter licences per the list as at 17.03.2025 | Depends on who actually provides the service: the provider, or an FDIC-regulated partner bank | In an unlicensed state the complaints route and disclosures differ; no agency arrangement is publicly described |

The table yields a conclusion a corridor list cannot: the customer is choosing not a service but a specific legal entity with a specific regulator — and, along with it, a specific set of ways to end up without a transfer. Russian contours close through a sanctions listing, the British and European ones through withdrawal from coverage and a particular bank's decision, the American one through the geography of state licences.

## What "licensed" actually covers: client money at an e-money institution

The gap between "registered" and "licensed" is material here, and each half is verified in a different register: company registration is Companies House, authorisation as an electronic money institution is the FCA register, and it carries no right to take deposits. Where such an authorisation sits in the UK permission hierarchy is set out in the [FCA licence map](https://wiki.private.law/en/uk-fca-license-map).

The Paysend terms state the consequences without softening: the multi-currency account is not a bank account, no interest is paid, client money is never lent, and because the funds are safeguarded they are not covered by a compensation scheme — neither the UK FSCS nor the Central Bank of Ireland's Deposit Guarantee Scheme. Safeguarding means client money is held with partner financial institutions separately from the firm's own funds; on insolvency the costs of the procedure are paid first, and customers are then paid out of the safeguarded accounts ahead of other creditors.

The UK mechanics come from the Payment and Electronic Money Institution Insolvency Regulations 2021: special administration, constitution of an asset pool, determination of claims, a bar date and pro rata distribution of any shortfall, with administration costs charged to the same pool where safeguarding failed. Since 7 May 2026 the tightened safeguarding rules under FCA PS25/12 apply on top. The comparison with deposit protection and the correspondent perimeter sits in the note on [safeguarding of client funds](https://wiki.private.law/en/correspondent-banking-safeguarding).

A third regulatory layer governs the end of the relationship, and it becomes useful exactly when a route has already closed: under SI 2025/688, in force from 28 April 2026, a neobank must give at least 90 days' notice of termination with a specific explanation of the reasons; for contracts entered into earlier the notice stays at two months.

Limits are a property of the contour rather than of the brand. Avosend states limits on crediting from Russia to Uzbekistan of 164,999,999 UZS per month and 16,499,988 UZS per day, the daily figure also being the maximum single transfer, counted across all transfers to one recipient card; funding runs from Mastercard, Visa and Mir cards in roubles and from HUMO and Uzcard cards in Uzbek som. KoronaPay operates four limit tiers tied to the depth of sender verification, with exact amounts shown only in the app. Comparing providers on the headline fee alone is meaningless: what counts is the amount that lands with the recipient on a specific corridor, because the price combines a transaction fee with an FX margin.

## What to check beyond the transfer service

The Russian side of the restrictions eased at the end of 2025: from 8 December 2025 the Bank of Russia cancelled the $1 million per month ceiling on transfers abroad for Russian citizens and individuals from friendly states, including the $10 thousand limit for money transfer systems. That removes one filter of the four and touches none of the other three — not the operator's sanctions status, not the receiving bank's policy, not the destination country's rules; the full set of Russian statuses and duties is collected in the [Russia hub](https://wiki.private.law/en/russia-hub).

Where the two-way restrictions come from is explained by the list of [states unfriendly to the RF](https://wiki.private.law/en/unfriendly-countries-for-russia). On larger or regular transfers the operator or the servicing bank asks for documents on the [source of funds](https://wiki.private.law/en/source-of-funds), and that request closes a route no less often than a sanctions listing does. Where the task is wider than a one-off transfer — an account, a multi-currency balance, receiving revenue — the comparison of regimes and client-money protection across neobanks is in the [neobanks](https://wiki.private.law/en/neobanks) overview.

> ⚠️ **Where this breaks most often.** The destination list is dynamic: a corridor being open on an earlier date does not guarantee that a new transfer will execute, and both operators say so expressly.
> Licence and availability are separate facts: KoronaPay Europe's Cypriot licence is in force while new outbound transfers have not been accepted since mid-2026.
> A sanctions listing attaches to a legal entity rather than to a brand, so checking by the service name produces a false negative.
> A balance at an electronic money institution carries no compensation scheme: on default an asset pool applies, with pro rata shortfalls and timelines measured in quarters, and where safeguarding failed the administration costs reduce the payout.
> The contract is with a different entity depending on residence, so a move changes the governing law — England and Wales for Paysend Plc, Ireland for Paysend EU DAC.
> Public sites are geo-dependent: the destinations and limits a reader sees outside the sending country may differ from what the app shows.

## Q/A

### Why does the service say its licence is in force while the transfer fails?

Because those are two independent facts. A licence confirms the operator's right to provide the service in its own jurisdiction; whether a particular corridor is available is decided by the operator's sanctions status, the risk policy of the banks at both ends and the destination country's rules. KoronaPay Europe is the clearest case: Cypriot e-money licence No. 115.1.3.30 exists, yet as at 14.08.2026 no new transfers from Europe were accepted and the site processed refunds only.

### How do I find out who owns a service and what to check in the sanctions lists?

Look for the legal entity rather than the brand: it is named in the site footer and in the customer terms and varies by the customer's country of residence. For KoronaPay the Russian side is RNKO Payment Center \(LLC\) under Bank of Russia licence No. 3166-K and the European side is Koronapay Europe Limited in Cyprus. For Paysend it is Paysend Plc in Scotland, Paysend EU DAC in Ireland and Paysend US LLC in the United States, while transfers from Russia under the Avosend brand are run by a separate entity, NKO Platezhi i Raschety \(JSC\). Those are the names to run against the lists.

### Can a transfer be sent from Russia through Paysend?

As at 28 August 2026 Russia is absent from the Paysend sending and receiving lists, and the Russian-language site carries no Russian licence line. Transfers from Russian cards are offered by Avosend, a service of NKO Platezhi i Raschety \(JSC\) under Bank of Russia licence No. 3324-R of 12.01.2018. Neither site claims a group link between the two brands on that date.

### Is money held with a payment service protected like a bank deposit?

No. An electronic money institution runs safeguarding rather than insurance: funds sit with partner institutions separately from the firm's own money and, on insolvency, are distributed from an asset pool after the costs of the procedure. Neither the FSCS nor the Irish Deposit Guarantee Scheme reaches such balances, and under the UK rules administration costs are charged to that same client pool where safeguarding failed.

### Does lifting the Central Bank's $1 million limit mean money now moves freely?

It removes one filter of four. From 8 December 2025 the ceiling on transfers abroad for Russian citizens and individuals from friendly states was cancelled, including the $10 thousand limit for money transfer systems. The operator's sanctions status, the receiving bank's willingness and the destination country's rules did not change, and a refusal at the receiving end occurs more often than a claim from the Russian regulator.

> 🍓 The corridor list goes stale; the mechanism does not. Four things close a route: a listing of the operator itself \(RNKO Payment Center under Council Implementing Regulation \(EU\) 2026/1843, the 21st package of 23.07.2026\), a provider quietly leaving a jurisdiction \(Russia is absent from Paysend's coverage as at 28.08.2026, while transfers from Russia are run by a separate entity, NKO Platezhi i Raschety, under Bank of Russia licence 3324-R\), secondary sanctions at the receiving bank, and the granular suspension of individual countries without notice. The check is always the same: find the legal entity, open the regulator's register, run that name against the sanctions lists, read the destinations page and record the date, test both ends of the route and send a small trial amount. And hold two things apart: a licence covers the right to provide a service, not the passability of a payment, and safeguarding at an electronic money institution is a place in the queue of a special administration, not deposit insurance.

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## Factual claims

- The mechanics then show themselves: the Cypriot licence formally exists, yet on 14 August 2026 the European service page stated that new transfers were unavailable and offered refunds of earlier ones.
- The service itself is live: Avosend's operator is NKO Platezhi i Raschety (JSC), tax number 6316049606, Samara, under Bank of Russia licence No.

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